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‘everything is beautiful’ problem
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Abstract: In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant introduces the notion of the 
reflective judgment and the a priori principle of purposiveness or systematicity of nature. 
He claims that the ability to judge objects by means of this principle underlies empirical 
concept acquisition and it is therefore necessary for cognition in general. In addition, he 
suggests that there is a connection between this principle and judgments of taste. Kant’s 
account of this connection has been criticized by several commentators for the reason that 
it leads to the ‘everythingisbeautiful’ problem. In this paper I argue, contrary to these 
objections, that both finding an object beautiful and acquiring the concept represent the 
satisfaction of the same principle of nature’s purposiveness, which refers to the same cogni-
tive need we have, that is, to systematize experience. I avoid the ‘everything is beautiful’ 
problem by arguing that aesthetic reflection refers to the synthesis of object’s individual 
and distinctive properties, while logical reflection refers to the synthesis of object’s general 
properties that it shares with other objects of its kind. Because aesthetic purposiveness is 
different from logical purposiveness, this allows for the possibility that we can have an 
object of cognition, without finding this object beautiful.
Keywords: free harmony; reflective judgments; principle of purposiveness.
1. Free harmony and the ‘Everything is Beautiful’ problem 
Kant’s task in the Critique of the Power of Judgment was to give an account of 
how genuine judgments of taste, that is, universally valid judgments about the 
beautiful, are possible. He claims that the feeling of pleasure of the beautiful 
depends on a state of mind that we all share and which is required for cogni-
tion in general. This state of mind is harmony between imagination and under-
standing that is not determined by a particular concept (i.e. free harmony). The 
experience of free harmony between imagination and understanding we have 
when we feel that a certain combination of elements in the object is just the 
right one, in which elements suit and complement each other, without however 
having any determinate rule that would serve as a basis for the justification of 
the appropriateness of the specific combination. It is the feeling of pleasure (or 
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displeasure) alone that expresses the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of 
a certain combination. Kant says that the feeling of pleasure is the confirma-
tion of a certain a priori principle, which we cannot state (5: 237; 121).1
In fact, when in the Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment 
Kant discusses the difference between determining and reflective judgments, 
he writes that the latter is governed by the subjective a priori principle of the 
purposiveness or systematicity of nature (5: 182; 69). He claims that this prin-
ciple is a necessary presupposition that guides us in our reflection on nature. 
The presupposition is that nature in its empirical diversity and heterogeneity is 
after all arranged coherently and systematically, and that it is therefore compat-
ible with our faculty of understanding and our ability to cognize nature. Kant 
introduces this principle as necessary for empirical concept acquisition. Also in 
the case of acquiring empirical concepts, the imagination’s activity of combin-
ing the manifold of intuition is not governed by concepts (these must first be 
found) and it is therefore an example of an activity between imagination and 
understanding that is in free play. Kant seems to suggest that the same indeter-
minate principle of purposiveness that governs free harmony in empirical con-
cept acquisition is also responsible for our ability to make judgments of taste.
However, it has been pointed out by several commentators that identification 
of the principle of purposiveness or systematicity of nature with the principle of 
taste leads to the ‘everythingisbeautiful’ problem. Namely, if the state of mind 
of free harmony or in other words, our ability to judge objects by the means of 
the a priori principle of purposiveness of nature, is a necessary condition for 
both judgments of taste and empirical concept acquisition, and if Kant identi-
fies the experience of free harmony with the feeling of pleasure that grounds 
judgments of the beautiful, then it follows that experience of pleasure is a neces-
sary condition for empirical concept acquisition. In other words, each time one 
acquires the concept, one must also experience the pleasure of the beautiful.
One might argue that on this account it is not strictly speaking every object 
of cognition that is experienced with the feeling of pleasure. The argument 
merely claims that one experiences pleasure in each case of acquiring a new 
concept. This suggests that in the case of perceiving the object for which I 
 1 References to Immanuel Kant will be given in the text to the volume and page number of the 
Akademie edition (KantsgesammelteSchriften, ed. Königlichen Preußischen [later Deutschen] Akad-
emie der Wissenschaften [Berlin: Georg Reimer (later Walter De Gruyter), 1900). References are also 
given, after a semicolon, to the English translation of Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, 
trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge University Press, 2000), which includes the “First 
Introduction” (vol. 20 of the Akademie edition). References to Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer, 
trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1998), are provided using the 
standard citations of the A and B editions (vols. 3 and 4 of the Akademie edition, respectively).
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already have the empirical concept, no pleasurable free harmony occurs. In 
this case the concept is already acquired; hence, my perception is governed 
by the concept. For example, my judging of the object as a chair is automatic, 
since I already have the concept of a chair, which determines how I will come 
to perceive the object. I do not need to question the appropriateness of my 
perception. Thus, it is not the case that every object of cognition must be ac-
companied with pleasure. It is merely that one’s first perceptual experience of 
an object, by which one arrives at the concept, is necessarily pleasing.2
However, the ‘everything is beautiful’ problem is much more prevalent than 
it appears at first sight. Namely, empirical concept acquisition or experienc-
ing free harmony between imagination and understanding logically precedes 
any conceptual determination. That is, in order to make a cognitive judgment 
that this X is a dog, one must first have the concept of a dog. But one acquires 
the concept of a dog through the synthesis of a sensible manifold without a 
concept (i.e. free harmony). This means that every act of empirical cognition is 
preceded by the act of free harmony, which is experienced through pleasure. 
That is, there is always a free harmony in the first act of perceiving the object, 
even though we might not be always aware of it through pleasure. Thus, every 
object of cognition must be beautiful.3
Different solutions to this problem have been proposed. What they all have 
in common is to argue against the identification of the principle of purposive-
ness or systematicity of nature with a principle of taste. In particular, they 
claim that the principle of systematicity of nature is concerned with the clas-
sification of objects under the system of species and genera (i.e., to think of 
nature as a logical system), while judgments of taste do not have as their aim 
to classify the object under the concept but is rather concerned with the in-
dividual object itself. Such a difference between logical and aesthetic purpo-
siveness presumably implies a difference in the principles underlying them.4 
 2 Kant suggests something similar in the Introduction. He claims that the experience of acquiring 
empirical concepts produces the feeling of pleasure. But that this pleasure eventually subsides in the 
course of becoming familiar with the object and so we do not notice it anymore (5: 188; 74).
 3 This is nicely pointed out by Rogerson. As he writes, “If we say that every act of concept acquisi-
tion requires us to recognize a free harmony, then we run up against something like the ‘everything 
is beautiful charge’. Once upon a time (during initial concept acquisition) every kind of object was 
‘appreciated’ as displaying a free harmony and, one would assume, gave us pleasure. But then it would 
follow, on Kant’s accounting, every kind of object was once appreciated as beautiful” (2007: 3).
 4 Allison (2001: 61-62), Guyer (1997: 44-47), Rueger et al. (2005: 232). The view that judgments of 
taste depend on a different principle than empirical concept acquisition is also defended by Hughes 
(2007). She distinguishes between the general principle of the purposiveness and its specific expres-
sion, that is, the notion of systematicity of nature. Judgments of taste are grounded on the general 
principle. In a similar way also Zuckert (2007) distinguishes between three kinds of non-determina-
tive judgments, that is, reflective judgments (empirical concept acquisition), judgments of taste and 
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Since experience of free harmony in empirical concept acquisition is funda-
mentally different to the experiencing free harmony in judgments of taste, it 
does not follow that every case of recognizing harmony in empirical concept 
acquisition results in pleasure. 
However, to introduce such a distinction between the state of mind in em-
pirical concept acquisition and in judgments of taste severs the connection 
between the universal validity of conditions necessary for cognition in general 
and universal validity of conditions for judgments of taste. Namely, Kant de-
rives the universal validity of judgments of taste from the state of mind that 
underlies cognition in general (empirical concept acquisition), because only 
this state of mind can be shared by all of us. But if we now propose that the 
state of mind of judgments of taste is not the state of mind underlying cogni-
tion, then it does not follow, strictly speaking, that the aesthetic state of mind 
is universally communicable. 
Among contemporary scholars, this problem in Kant’s theory is inflicted by 
the following dilemma: either the state of mind of judgments of taste is identi-
fied with the state of mind underlying empirical concept acquisition or it is 
not. If it is, then it follows that every object is beautiful, even though we do not 
always experience it as such. And if it is not, then the universal validity of free 
harmony required for pleasure cannot be derived from the universal validity of 
free harmony required for empirical concept acquisition.5
In this paper I argue, contrary to the majority view, that the notion of the re-
flective power of judgment is primarily concerned with our ability to conceptu-
alize experience and that this ability is exercised not merely in logical reflective 
judgments (empirical concept acquisition), but in judgments of taste as well.6 
This ability to judge objects by means of the principle of purposiveness under-
lies our empirical concept formation, and is therefore necessary for cognition 
in general. Aesthetic reflective judgments are due to the same principle and 
depend on the same ability to experience free harmony. Furthermore, they are 
universally valid because they are due to the principle of purposiveness, which 
is necessary for all of us, and without which we would not be able to form em-
pirical concepts and therefore to have cognition at all. In addition, I propose a 
distinction between logical and aesthetic reflective judgments such that it can 
avoid the ‘everything is beautiful’ problem.
teleological judgments. All three judgments depend on a general principle, the ‘principle of purpo-
siveness without a purpose’, concerned with nature being purposive for our cognitive faculties.
 5 See Meerbote (1982: 80-83) who first proposed this dilemma. For a version of this dilemma, 
applied particularly to empirical concept acquisition, see Rogerson (2008: 18-19).
 6 A judgment is logical when “its predicate is a given objective concept” (20: 223; 25).
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2. Reflective judgments and the principle of the purposiveness of 
nature
Judgments of taste are aesthetic reflective judgments, that is, we judge the 
object according to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Kant discusses the 
reflective power of judgment in general in the Introduction to the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment. Reflective judgments, together with determining judg-
ments, belong to one of the three faculties of thought, that is, to the faculty 
of judgment. Kant defines the faculty of judgment as the “faculty for the sub-
sumption of the particular under the general” (20: 201; 8). The function of the 
power of judgment is to connect empirical intuition with the appropriate con-
cept, and thus to attain harmony between the imagination and understanding. 
This procedure of the power of judgment is attained by the means of a schema. 
A schema is a sort of an abstract image and a rule at the same time, that is, a 
rule for linking sensible manifold with its appropriate concept. Kant illustrates 
the function of a schema in the following way: “The concept dog signifies a 
rule whereby my imagination can trace the shape of such a four-footed animal 
in a general way, i.e., without being limited to any single and particular shape 
offered to me by experience” (A141). Accordingly, a concept of a dog specifies 
the essential characteristics of a dog, such as a four-footed animal. A schema 
on the other hand represents an abstract image of the essential properties and 
the relations that obtain between them.7 Even though there are different kinds 
of dogs, they all entail this rule or schema in virtue of which they are recog-
nized as dogs. Based on the given empirical intuition a schema selects which 
properties are to be picked up and combined together. For example, perceiv-
ing features such as a tail and four feet will activate the schema ‘animal’ or 
more specific schema ‘dog’ and organize the empirical intuition in accordance 
with this schema (that the features such as head, body, fur ought to follow, 
and arrange them in their specific relations). Kant describes such activity of 
judging as a determining power of judgment (5: 179; 67). If one already has 
the schema (rule) of a dog, the power of judgment recognizes this rule in the 
sensible manifold, that is, it brings the sensible intuition to concepts. The de-
 7 The kinds of schemata properly discussed by Kant are transcendental schemata related to cat-
egories. However, there is textual evidence that Kant was also committed to the view that empirical 
concepts have schemata. For example, he writes: “Even less is an object of experience or an im-
age thereof ever adequate to the empirical concept; rather, that concept always refers directly to the 
schema of imagination” (A141/B180). Robert Pippin (1982: 144), who defends this view, writes that 
if empirical concepts would not have their own schema, then “empirical concepts would have to be 
nothing but strung-along memories of numerous similar individual and individual properties For a 
similar view see also Pendlebury (1995: 777-797). 
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termining power of judgment is under the control of the understanding and 
its concepts, governing the imaginative synthesis of intuition. Accordingly, the 
imagination in determining judgments is not a free activity. 
The reflective power of judgment, on the other hand, is activated when we 
are presented with a sensible manifold for which we do not yet have a concept. 
The aim of the power of judgment is to attain harmony between imagination 
and understanding, but since in this case we have no concept under which 
to subsume the manifold, this concept must first be found. Ascending from 
the particular to the universal is the task of the reflective power of judgment. 
The role of the reflective power of judgment is to find a new concept under 
which the particular can be subsumed, so that the determining judgment can 
be made. The reflective power of judgment is necessary to make more specific 
determining cognitive judgments, when one does not already have the concept. 
Since reflective judgment is not governed by determinate concepts (these must 
be found first), it is an example of activity of judging in which imagination and 
understanding are in free play: “The powers of cognition that are set into play 
by this representation are hereby in a free play, since no determinate concept 
restricts them to a particular rule of cognition” (5: 217; 102).
To find the universal for a particular, that is, to make a reflective judgment, 
is however not an arbitrary procedure. Kant claims that there is in fact a prin-
ciple, found in the power of judgment itself, and which governs our reflection 
and search for universals. Kant describes this principle as a principle that rep-
resents nature as a system: 
in which the manifold, divided into genera and species, makes it possible to bring 
all the natural forms that are forthcoming to concepts (of greater or lesser generality) 
through comparison (20: 212; 15).
Kant’s argument for postulating the principle of purposiveness as necessary 
for empirical cognition can be reconstructed in the following way: 
(1) We are in possession of pure concepts of the understanding, which 
determine nature in the most general way. However, these concepts do 
not determine the empirical content of specific natural forms, such as 
dogs, stones, flower, fish, or of particular events, such as the warmness of 
the stone being caused by the sun (5: 183; 70). 
(2) Since the categories do not determine the empirical content of specific 
natural forms, then, without any further presupposition, there could be 
such a diversity of natural forms and events that we could never under-
stand nature as a unified and coherent system. There could be so many 
ways of organizing these particular experiences, that without the presup-
position of underlying unity we could never understand nature as a sys-
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tematically organized whole. Categories alone cannot guarantee for the 
coherence of our empirical cognition (20: 203; 9). 
(3) But we do have an experience of purposive forms in nature and of 
some systematic relations that obtain among forms and laws (for example, 
a classification of biological forms into the system of genera and species). 
(4) Hence, this means that in addition to the pure concepts of the under-
standing, there must be a principle which guides us in making our expe-
rience of empirical nature coherent and systematic. As Kant writes, the 
principle “makes it possible for our power of judgment to find consensus 
in the comparison of natural forms and to arrive at empirical concepts, 
and their interconnection with each other, through ascent to more gen-
eral but still empirical concepts” (20: 213; 16). 
According to Kant’s reasoning, we must assume that reflective judgment, 
which looks for the universal for a particular, operates under the pressuposi-
tion that nature in its specificity forms a system in which all phenomena are 
related to each other and divided into the genera and species. This assumption 
makes it possible for reflective judgment to look for the commonalities in natu-
ral forms, and therefore to bring them under the universals. This assumption 
of the systematicity of nature is necessary for the rationality and coherency of 
our reflection, because without it “all reflection would become arbitrary and 
blind, and hence would be undertaken without any well-grounded expectation 
of its agreement with nature” (20: 212; 16).
3. The principle of purposiveness and judgments of taste
Kant discusses the principle of purposiveness or systematicity of nature 
mainly in relation to its use in empirical concept acquisition. But in addition 
he suggests that there is a connection between this principle and judgments of 
taste. This connection is implicit in Kant’s formulation of a judgment of taste as 
a reflective judgment, in which we compare a representation of the object with 
our own cognitive faculty (ability to bring intuition to concepts) (20: 211; 15). 
Kant writes that the principle of purposiveness is a necessary presupposition 
that precedes all reflection and comparison (20: 211; 16), which implies that it 
precedes comparison specific for judgments of taste as well. 
Before proceeding to a full explanation, I briefly want to point out some 
of the reasons in favor of this position. First, Kant claims that the principle of 
the purposiveness or systematicity of nature (PPN) represents nature as being 
amenable to our cognitive abilities, that is, as allowing for harmony between 
the imagination and understanding. But this is the meaning of the pleasure in 
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a beautiful object: “the pleasure can express nothing but its suitability to the 
cognitive faculties that are in play in the reflecting power of judgment, inso-
far as they are in play, and thus merely a subjective formal purposiveness of 
the object” (5: 190; 76). Hence, it is justified to assume that PPN is the prin-
ciple underlying judgments of taste (PJT) as well. Second, Kant formulates 
PPN as the subjective a priori principle of the power of judgment. That is, the 
principle determines the subject alone, and not objects. It is a principle that 
is necessary for all subjects in their reflection on nature; hence it is an inter-
subjectively valid principle, rather than objective. But judgments of taste also 
depend on: “a subjective principle, which determines what pleases or dis-
pleases only through feeling and not through concepts, but yet with universal 
validity” (5: 238; 122). Hence, PPN and PJT are both exclusively concerned 
with the subject and so cannot be distinguished on this basis. Third, PPN is 
a necessary principle that guides our reflection on nature and our ability to 
acquire empirical concepts. But Kant also characterizes PJT as the principle 
that is necessary for cognition in general. He writes: 
pleasure must necessarily rest on the same conditions in everyone, since they are 
subjective conditions of the possibility of cognition in general and the proportion 
of these cognitive faculties that is required for taste is also requisite for the common 
and healthy understanding that one may presuppose in everyone (5: 292; 173). 
Accordingly, PJT is the principle which grounds the possibility of having 
cognition, but to have empirical cognition depends on PPN. Fourth, Kant 
claims that PPN is inherently connected to the feeling of pleasure or displea-
sure. He writes: 
the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is only the receptivity of a determination 
of the subject, so that if the power of judgment is to determine anything for itself 
alone, it could not be anything other than the feeling of pleasure, and, conversely, if 
the latter is to have an a priori principle at all, it will be found only in the power of 
judgment (20: 208; 12). 
Therefore, both PPN and PJT determine the subject through the feeling 
of pleasure and displeasure. Taking all of these points together we are justi-
fied in concluding that PPN and PJT are one and the same principle.8
While prima facie, it seems controversial to claim that a single principle is 
responsible for cognitive inquiry and for experiencing beauty, this connec-
tion can be legitimized by pointing out what, at the basic level, the principle 
of purposiveness of nature amounts to. And that is a certain way of seeing 
 8 This is also the view suggested by Matthews (2010: 63-79), Baz (2005: 1-32), Ginsborg (1997: 63-78). 
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the world, that is, for preferring one way of organizing sensible manifold, 
to another. This preference for organizing manifold of intuition in a cer-
tain way, more particularly, in a way that represents nature as a system, is 
reflected in our cognition, but also occasionally in the feeling of pleasure in 
finding an object beautiful. For example, in preferring certain combinations 
(such as the spiral structure of petals in a rose) and disliking others (such 
as the disorganized aftermath of a storm or tornado). The principle is an 
idea about how the world is supposed to be, how we expect it to be, so that 
it allows our understanding to cognize it, and it is an idea that holds only 
for us, as cognitive beings. Accordingly, the feeling of pleasure is a result of 
the confirmation or satisfaction of the principle of purposiveness. We ap-
preciate forms that are in accordance with this principle and that reassure 
us that the world is indeed such as we expect it to be, namely, amenable to 
our cognitive abilities. On the other hand, feeling of displeasure is a result 
of the dissatisfaction of our expectation that the world is amenable to our 
cognitive abilities. This inability to know the world occasions the state of 
estrangement between us, our mental structure, and the world, which pro-
duces the feeling of displeasure.
In fact, Kant suggests that the principle of purposiveness is properly re-
vealed only in judgments of taste. He writes:
It is therefore properly only in taste, and especially with regard to objects in na-
ture, in which alone the power of judgment reveals itself as a faculty that has its own 
special principle and thereby makes a well-founded claim to a place in the general 
critique of the higher faculties of cognition, which one would perhaps not have en-
trusted to it (20: 244; 43). 
This implies that the principle is not revealed in empirical concept ac-
quisition, even though it is also necessary for them. On my understanding, 
Kant’s thought can be explained with reference to the two kinds of reflection 
employed in the power of judgment. He writes that in empirical concept 
acquisition, reflecting is comparing one object with other objects in order 
to find common features (the concept). In judgments of taste, on the other 
hand, reflecting is comparing a single object with our own faculty of cogni-
tion. This means that in the first case the primary result of the comparison 
made in accordance with the principle is the perception of the commonalities 
between two objects. However, in judgments of taste the primary result is the 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and it is this feeling that reveals the extent 
to which the principle of purposiveness is satisfied by the object.
Some of the commentators have argued against the view that the principle 
of the purposiveness or systematicity of nature is the principle of judgments of 
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taste.9 Ordinarily, two main objections against this view are raised. First, that 
the principle of the purposiveness of nature is concerned with finding the em-
pirical determinate concepts for particulars, and therefore with the classifica-
tion of objects under species and genera. This procedure of logical reflection is 
characterized by comparing different objects with each other in order to find 
common properties between them. Accordingly, what is considered as purpo-
sive is the relation between objects. On the other hand, judgments of taste are 
not cognitive judgments and do not have as their aim to find a concept under 
which to classify the object. Aesthetic reflection proceeds by comparing an 
individual object with our cognitive abilities. Accordingly, aesthetic purposive-
ness is in the object itself, and not in the relation between objects. It results in 
the feeling of pleasure alone, and not in a concept. 
The second objection is that the feeling of pleasure resulting from the con-
firmation of the principle of purposiveness is not an aesthetic pleasure. Kant 
writes that the feeling of pleasure resulting from finding conceptual purposive-
ness ceases to exist once we have become familiar with the object (5: 187; 73). 
But the feeling of pleasure in finding an object beautiful is fundamentally dif-
ferent. A beautiful rose sustains one’s pleasure no matter how familiar one 
becomes with it. Aesthetic pleasure does not cease to exist. Overall, the differ-
ence between logical and aesthetic purposiveness presumably implies a differ-
ence in the principles underlying them. 
It is true that Kant explains the distinction between logical (conceptual) and 
aesthetic purposiveness as a distinction between purposiveness in the relation 
between objects(20: 216; 19) and purposiveness in the object itself (5: 190; 76). 
Purposiveness in the relation between ‘objects’ leads to the formation of a de-
terminate concept. But the purposiveness of a particular form itself leads to the 
feeling of pleasure alone. 
However, the fact that purposiveness can be thought to exist at two levels 
(that is, between objects and in the object) does not necessarily imply that 
there must be two different principles of reflective judgments, that is, a prin-
ciple of logical purposiveness and a principle of aesthetic purposiveness. I 
argue that these are different manifestations of the same principle. In each 
case the principle functions with the aim of producing a synthesis between 
intuition and concepts (attain the agreement between nature and our cogni-
tive abilities). The difference is due to the scope of that on which the prin-
ciple acts in each case. 
Kant writes that reflection on the object can proceed in two ways: “To re-
flect (to consider), however, is to compare and to hold together given repre-
 9 Allison (2001: 61-62), Rueger et al. (2005: 232), Caranti (2005: 364-374).
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sentations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to 
a concept thereby made possible” (20: 211; 15). Comparing objects with each 
other results in the formation of an empirical concept and in making a cogni-
tive judgment. The comparison of a single object with our cognitive abilities 
alone results in aesthetic pleasure and in making a judgment of taste. Yet, both 
kinds of reflection satisfy the same cognitive aim of a judgment, that is, to find 
the universal for the particular. And this process is governed by the principle 
of the purposiveness of nature. 
The connection between the principle of purposiveness and judgments of 
taste can be legitimized in the following way. Kant claims that judgments of 
taste are merely reflective judgments. And he understands merely reflective judg-
ments as judgments concerned with finding the universal: “If, however, only 
the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power 
of judgment is merely reflecting” (5: 179; 66). This indicates that a judgment of 
taste is also one in which universals for a particular form of the object is be-
ing sought, just as in logical reflective judgments. Indeed, if we take a closer 
look at the passage where Kant describes the two types of reflection (logical 
and aesthetic), he claims that both are made “in relation to a concept thereby 
made possible”. Similarly, he states: “The satisfaction in the beautiful must 
depend upon reflection on an object that leads to some sort of concept (it is 
indeterminate which)” (5: 207; 92). Based on this, we can say that Kant under-
stands both types of judgments as leading to a concept, and since the principle 
of purposiveness is precisely that which allows the power of judgment to find 
concepts, it must be that each type of judgment is made in reference to this 
same principle. It remains to be seen, then, in what way the two types of reflec-
tive judgment are in fact distinct. 
I argue that the difference between logical and aesthetic reflective judg-
ments is that the concept found in the former case is determinate in the sense 
in which the criteria of its application can be explicitly articulated, whereas in 
the latter case the concept is indeterminate, with the judgment depending only 
on the feeling of pleasure.10 Even though a judgment of taste does not result in 
a determinate concept, it does after all satisfy the need of a reflective judgment 
to find the concept for the particular. When we find an object beautiful, we 
feel there is a tangible account of this, as if beauty were a concept, yet we are 
unable to define it.11 In the case of logical reflective judgments, the principle 
 10 Kant does not specify his notion of an ‘indeterminate concept’. I take it to refer to a sort of a 
concept which evades articulation and discursive expression. Something similar is suggested by Wol-
terstorff 1991: 105-127. He interprets an indeterminate concept found in judgments of taste as ‘aptness 
concept’. It is a concept similar to a determinate concept, but which cannot be specified. 
 11 AvnerBaz (2004: 67) nicely expresses this characteristic of beauty by saying: “beauty is that 
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of purposiveness is satisfied through finding a determinate concept, this latter 
being a relation that we recognize as holding between the forms of different 
objects. In the case of judgments of taste, on the other hand, no determinate 
concept is found, and so this is not a case of recognizing a relation between 
objects. However, a feeling of pleasure in a judgment of taste indicates that the 
principle of purposiveness is confirmed in these cases. Given that the principle 
of purposiveness is only confirmed in judgments where the systematicity of 
nature is exhibited, and that judgments of taste do not pertain to relations 
between objects, this systematicity must be exhibited in the relation between 
the object and our cognitive faculties. That is, a beautiful object discloses the 
systematicity of nature at the most particular and concrete level and it does 
that through the feeling of pleasure alone.
A judgment in general, Kant claims, is the ability to think the particular un-
der a universal. A judgment of taste is not an exception. The difference is only 
that in a judgment of taste, of the form ‘this X is beautiful’, the predicate does 
not refer to a determinate concept, since the criteria for its application cannot 
be explicitly articulated, but consist only in the feeling of pleasure. Hence, in 
judgments of taste no determinate cognition can be made. 
This is because Kant understands concepts as representing general proper-
ties that different objects share with each other. Purposiveness can result in a 
determinate concept only when we compare different objects with each other 
in order to find commonalities among them, since only general features can be 
explicitly communicated. But in judgments of taste, Kant claims, we reflect on 
the particular object itself, without comparing it with others. Aesthetic reflec-
tion is a reflection on an object’s individual and distinctive properties; hence 
this purposiveness cannot be grasped in a determinate concept. We can explic-
itly articulate criteria for why we would classify something as a flower, or a face, 
but we cannot state such criteria that uniquely identify particular objects in all 
their detail. For instance, it is impossible to give a description that would apply 
completely accurately and uniquely to the flower on my windowsill, and yet this 
particular thing is the object of aesthetic reflection. A direct acquaintance with 
this object is the only way to make a judgment of taste concerning it. This con-
trasts with the case of a logical reflective judgment, since in this case we could 
know whether a determinate concept applies simply by a sufficient enumeration 
of its properties, without having to be directly acquainted with the object itself. 
Free harmony in logical reflective judgment always results in recognizing the 
common properties (determination of the object under the concept). 
about the object which calls (…) for articulation and expression, and yet evades all available concepts, 
or the habitual and common forms of expression”.
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The purposiveness in a judgment of taste, on the other hand, cannot depend 
on whether a determinate concept applies, but is revealed through the feeling 
of pleasure alone. This however does not mean that no universal has been 
found. It means only that the universal can be grasped through the feeling of 
pleasure alone. The sole experience of the feeling of pleasure in judgments of 
taste substitutes for the role of determinate concepts in cognitive judgments. 
Kant alludes to such an idea when he writes: “as if beauty were a property 
of the object and the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the object 
through concepts of it)” (5: 211; 96). The feeling of pleasure is the way one 
recognizes purposiveness in an individual object, just as a determinate concept 
is the way one recognizes the purposiveness of an object’s general properties.
Before I continue with the discussion on logical and aesthetic purposive-
ness, let me first explain in more detail what I mean by the distinction between 
general and individual properties of an object. This distinction, I take it, refers 
to Kant’s distinction between schema and a particular image. According to 
Kant’s epistemological theory, the application of some empirical concepts to 
the manifold of intuition is necessary in order to have perceptual experience of 
the object.12 The concept of the object is applied to the manifold of intuition 
by the means of a schema (i.e. an abstract form that all objects of its kind share 
with each other and in virtue of which they are recognized). For example, a 
schema of a flower is a basic figurative mental representation of an object with 
petals, leaves and stems in a certain relation that obtain among these features, 
irrespective of other distinctive features they have. Schema represents a gen-
eral form that all particular images of a flower have in common. 
At the same time, however, the schema differs from the image. A schema 
represents only the general features of a particular object, hence it is incom-
plete comparing to the image of an actual object. An image is always a particu-
lar representation, and therefore it embodies general features in its own unique 
way. For example, even though all flowers share the same schema, they display 
immense diversity in their particular instantiations. A particular image of a 
flower may have a distinct shape of petals in a particular combination of colors. 
But these distinctive features of this particular flower are not entailed by the 
concept of a flower. In other words, even though my perception of the flower is 
governed by the concept of a flower, the concept of the flower is not sufficient 
to fully determine the combination of manifold of intuition in this particular 
presentation of a flower. The presence of these additional features which are 
 12 To a great extent this has been pointed out by Guyer (2006: 178-181). In short, the argument 
is that categories cannot differentiate between various images, because they are abstract concepts, 
and hence in order to have any particular image my sense impressions must be governed by empirical 
concepts as well.
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not entailed by the concept shows that the activity of imagination is not fully 
determined by the concept, and therefore it is in free play.
Accordingly, it can be said that the form of the object can be thought to 
exist at two levels. A particular flower, for instance, has a general (abstract) 
form which it shares with other objects of its kind. Yet, this particular flower 
also has an individual form, that is, the distinctive combination of the general 
features. The individual form exists within the constraints of the abstract form 
(schema), and represents a unique employment of the properties that constitute 
the general form specified by the concept.
Consider, for example, the painting Weeping Woman (1937) by Pablo Pi-
casso. One can immediately recognize that this is a painting of a human face. 
By making a determining judgment that this is a human face, that the paint-
ing represents, the imagination is not free, since it combines the manifold of 
intuition in accordance with the concept. One perceives the head, eyes, nose, 
and lips, as presented by the schema of a human face. But one also perceives 
a specific and distinctive configuration of these features. The face is painted 
in different geometrical shapes, split into fragments; the shapes of the mouth, 
teeth, tears and the handkerchief used to dry the tears are almost fused into 
each other; the sides of the face are juxtaposed in such a way that they offer 
simultaneously a frontal and profile perspective of the face. But these distinc-
tive features are not specified by the schema of a human face. Hence, they are 
product of imagination in its freedom. A form of the object in which imagina-
tion is free occurs, if the sensible manifold apprehended by the imagination 
exhibits such features that exceed the general conditions (schema), which are 
necessary requirements for the concept to be applied. It is these additional 
features that occasion aesthetic reflection and which can nevertheless be either 
in harmony or disharmony with the understanding, resulting in a positive or a 
negative aesthetic reaction, respectively.
To return to the discussion on purposiveness, both logical and aesthetic 
purposiveness represent the satisfaction of our cognitive aim to find purposive-
ness in nature. In logical reflective judgments, finding a determinate concept 
for the particular is the confirmation of our principle of purposiveness, hence, 
pleasure is indirectly produced. But in aesthetic reflective judgments, where 
purposiveness cannot be grasped in a determinate concept, the confirmation 
of the principle can be experienced directly through the feeling of pleasure 
alone. In fact, it is precisely because aesthetic purposiveness does not result in 
a determinate concept that the experience of pleasure does not cease to exist, 
as happens in logical reflective judgments. 
Kant claims that the feeling of pleasure resulting from finding a determi-
nate concept for the particular ceases to exist once we become familiar with 
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the object. He writes: 
we no longer detect any noticeable pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature and 
the unity of its division into genera and species, by means of which alone empirical 
concepts are possible through which we cognize it in its particular laws; but it must 
certainly have been there in its time, and only because the most common experience 
would not be possible without it has it gradually become mixed up with mere cogni-
tion and is no longer specially noticed (5: 187; 73). 
The explanation is that pleasure resulting from a sucessfull unification of 
nature (in a concept) ceases to exist once it becomes fused with cognition. 
What Kant means by this is that once we acquire the concept for the particular, 
and once our subsumption of the particular under the concept (identification 
of the object) becomes automatic and spontaneous (procedure of a determin-
ing judgment), then the object no longer gives us pleasure. This explanation 
implies that in a case of the unification of nature which does not result in a 
determinate concept, then pleasure, produced by the sucessfull unification, 
cannot become fused with cognition. And if this is so, then, based on Kant’s 
reasoning, the pleasure does not cease to exist. But the experience of nature 
that shows itself to be amenable to our cognitive need of subsuming the par-
ticular under the concept, yet which does not result in a determinate concept 
is an aesthetic experience of purposiveness. Hence, the feeling of pleasure in 
a judgment of taste does not cease to exist. Aesthetic purposiveness depends 
on the sole experience of free harmony, where imagination and understanding 
continuously mutually support and animate each other, thereby prolonging the 
process of play between them and thus the feeling of pleasure.
To sum up, judgments of logical and aesthetic purposiveness are made in 
reference to the same principle of the purposiveness or systematicity of nature, 
and they are both accompanied by pleasure. The difference is that in aesthetic 
reflective judgments the feeling of pleasure does not cease to exist because pur-
posiveness does not result in a determinate concept. The feeling of pleasure in 
a beautiful object is a perennial reminder of the object’s suitability for us and 
our cognitive abilities. 
I should point out here that it is consistent with this interpretation that the 
opposite can also be the case. If our apprehension of the object disagrees with 
our understanding, that is, if our representation of nature contradicts the prin-
ciple of purposiveness, then this relation will cause a feeling of displeasure. 
Kant explains the possibility of such disharmony in his description of logical 
reflective judgments.13 In this case, displeasure is felt in our inability to find the 
 13 Kant writes: “a representation of nature that foretold that even in the most minor investigation 
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appropriate concept for different heterogeneous individuals. It is their relation 
that resists our idea of purposiveness in its logical employment (to locate the 
particular in the system of nature). In aesthetic reflective judgments, on the 
other hand, feeling of displeasure is the result of the disagreement between the 
particular aspects of the object and the principle of purposiveness. Further-
more, because we all have the same cognitive need to find purposiveness in na-
ture, the feeling of displeasure, resulting from the dissatisfaction of this need, 
is also universally valid. Kant’s view of reflective judgments is consistent with 
the possibility of reflective disharmony, because in reflective judgments we are 
concerned with the unification of those individual and particular aspects of na-
ture that are left undetermined by pure concepts. Since these specific empirical 
aspects of objects are not determined by pure concepts, they do not necessarily 
find their agreement with our understanding. Even though our reflection on 
these aspects is not blind, but guided by the transcendental presupposition of 
the principle of purposiveness, this principle need not be satisfied in all cases. 
The principle of purposiveness is merely a necessary subjective presupposition 
about nature, hence it does not follow that nature’s purposiveness is always 
guaranteed. It is possible that we come across such heterogeneity and diversity 
of natural forms that we are unable to unify them (bring them under concepts). 
The feeling of displeasure in this case results from experiencing a conflict or 
disharmony between nature and our cognitive abilities.14
4. The solution of the ‘Everything is Beautiful’ problem
Judgments of taste depend on our ability to experience free harmony be-
tween imagination and understanding, in other words, on our ability to judge 
objects by the means of the a priori subjective principle of the purposiveness 
of nature. This ability also underlies empirical concept acquisition. Kant’s idea 
is that free harmony is the cause of the feeling of pleasure of beauty. But this 
implies not only that I feel pleasure in making a judgment of taste (of the beauti-
ful), but I must also experience pleasure each time I acquire the empirical con-
cept. This implies that all objects of cognition must be experienced as beautiful.
The interpretation I have developed can meet this problem. The solution 
of the most common experience we would stumble on a heterogeneity in its laws that would make 
the unification of its particular laws under universal empirical ones impossible for our understand-
ing would thoroughly displease us; because this would contradict the principle of the subjective-
purposive specification of nature in its genera and our reflecting power of judgment with respect to 
the latter” (5: 188; 74). 
 14 It has been pointed out by Paul Guyer that Kant’s theory of taste cannot accommodate judg-
ments of ugliness. SeeGuyer (2005: 141-162). For the opposite view seeKuplen (2013: 102-143).
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depends on distinguishing between two different ways that the principle of 
purposiveness is employed in aesthetic and logical reflective judgments. It is 
only in an aesthetic and not logical reflective judgment that the principle is 
employed in a way that produces the relevant feeling of pleasure, which leads 
to judgments of the beautiful. My reasoning is the following. 
Based on Kant, an object is considered aesthetically purposive (i.e. beauti-
ful) when its representation is immediately connected to pleasure (5: 189; 75). 
But what is immediately connected with pleasure can only be the reflection on 
an object’s particular combination of properties. Accordingly, only when we 
reflect on an object as an individual do we in fact make an aesthetic reflective 
judgment. Kant claims that a judgment of taste concerns a singular representa-
tion of the object. In aesthetic reflection we are interested in the nature of the 
particular object and the relation between cognitive powers that this singu-
lar representation generates. The subject of aesthetic experience is the mere 
form of the object, say, this particular Danxia landform in Zhangye (China) 
with its dramatic ups and downs mountains and with its unique early morning 
colors,without the consideration of what the object represents, namely being 
a rocky landscape. In other words, in aesthetic reflective judgments, the prin-
ciple of purposiveness is applied to the individual object, but purposiveness of 
an individual object cannot be grasped in a determinate concept, because as 
said previously, concepts can only provide a unity of different representation 
possessing some common features and cannot represent individual features. 
Hence, purposiveness of an individual object can be revealed through the feel-
ing of pleasure alone. And only this is an aesthetic representation of purposive-
ness that grounds judgments of the beautiful. In logical reflective judgments, 
however, the principle of purposiveness is not applied to an individual object; 
rather it is used to find commonalities between different objects and this pur-
posiveness results in a determinate concept. 
In sum, only when we reflect on an object as an individual can the principle 
of purposiveness give rise to the pleasure of beauty. A beautiful object dis-
closes purposiveness of nature at the most concrete and particular level which 
for this reason cannot be grasped in a determinate concept, but in the feeling 
of pleasure alone. 
Because aesthetic purposiveness (purposiveness of a singular form) is dif-
ferent from logical purposiveness (purposiveness between forms), this allows 
for the possibility that not all objects, for which empirical concepts are found, 
are aesthetically pleasing or beautiful just because their cognition depends 
on the activity of judging in which cognitive powers are in free play. Beauty is 
a purposiveness of an object’s individual properties, while cognition is a pur-
posiveness of an object in virtue of its common properties, and this allows for 
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the possibility that not all objects of cognition are beautiful. That is, we can 
have an object of cognition, that is, we may be able to recognize the manifold 
under a concept, without this object being regarded as beautiful. Even more, 
since Kant’s conception of reflective judgment allows for the possibility of 
reflective disharmony, we can have an object of cognition (that is, classify the 
object into the system of genera and species), while at the same time this ob-
ject (its individual aspects) can be perceived as aesthetically displeasing. That 
is, reflection on an object’s individual form can be in disconformity with the 
principle of the purposiveness, and we can therefore find such an object ugly. 
For example, we can recognize that a particular object, say an animal called 
fangtooth belongs to the species called Anoplogaster Cornuta, hence finding 
its concept in the hierarchy of species and genera, while nevertheless finding 
it ugly. This shows that the fangtooth is not aesthetically displeasing due to 
the disagreement with the natural kind to which it belongs. This particular 
animal may be a perfect specimen of its kind, that is, it can satisfy all the 
conditions required for an object to belong to this kind, yet still be ugly. The 
fangtooth is judged to be one of the most grotesque sea creatures by virtue of 
its black body, disproportionately large head, wide open jaw and long, sharp 
teeth. It is in virtue of the distinctive combination of the fangtooth’s features 
that displeasure is occasioned, even though these features are shared by all 
members of this natural kind. The aesthetic feeling of displeasure is a peren-
nial reminder that an object’s individual form is not suitable for us and our 
cognitive abilities. 
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